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Litigating Extra-Territorial Nuisances under English Common Law and 
UK Statute. 
1 Introduction 
English nuisance law is an area of tort law that remedies interferences with the use and 
enjoyment of land in accordance with the principle of ‘good neighbourliness’.1 For many 
centuries, it has tackled pollution of air and water, with one commentator characterising it 
aptly as ‘among the earliest forms of environmental protection the world has known’.2 Every 
country has an equivalent of nuisance, but the English version is particularly important 
historically since, at the height of the British Empire, it remedied industrial-scale pollution 
across 40% of the world’s territory, often ‘supplementing’ local laws and regulations.3 
Against this backdrop, this article examines a current problem: English judges, sitting in 
English courts, being asked to hear ‘foreign’ nuisance claims of an environmental nature.4  
The focus of the discussion is the on-going extra-territorial nuisance litigation around the 
exploitation of oil in the Niger Delta by Shell Petroleum Development Company of Nigeria 
Ltd (SPDC) and Royal Dutch Shell (RDS)
5
 in the English court. The Shell nuisance litigation 
under scrutiny began with a claim brought by 15,000 members of the Ogoni People, whose 
land and livelihoods were (and continue to be) injured by oil spills associated with the 
defendant’s works in 2008 and 2009. The claim was initially brought against both RDS and 
                                                          
 
1
  See e.g. Lord Millett, in Southwark LBC v Mills [2001] AC 1, 20 (‘Good neighbourliness, involves 
reciprocity. A landowner must show the same consideration for his neighbour as he would expect his neighbour 
to show for him’). 
2
 R. Palmer, ‘Common Law Environmental Protection: the Future of Private Nuisance, Part 1’ (2014) 6 
International Journal of Law in the Built Environment 21. For case studies on the application of nuisance law in 
an environmental setting see B. Pontin, Nuisance Law and Environmental Protection (Lawtext Publishing 
2013).  
3
 For example in the British Mandate Palestine case of Heller v Taasiyah Chemith Tel Aviv Co Ltd (1944) SCJ 
37, Judge Windham granted an injunction against a polluting chemical factory located near Tel Aviv. He held 
that Article 1200 of the Mejelle code – the local law addressed to nuisance - was supplemented by substantive 
English common law nuisance provisions and the equitable remedy of an injunction (at 38). Reference is made 
to a ‘long line of English cases to the effect that it is no defence to a civil action for nuisance to show that the 
benefit to the general public [of the polluting activitiy] exceeds the detriment to the plaintiff’ (at 43). See further 
D. Schorr, ‘The Taasiyah Chemith Case: Pollution Law in the Palestine Mandate’,  Paper Presented at World 
Congress of Environmental History Copenhagen, August, 2009. 
4
 These cases are not exclusive to England. Four Nigerians and the campaign group Friends of the Earth filed 
suits in 2008 in The Hague, where Shell has its global headquarters, seeking reparations for lost income from 
contaminated land and waterways in the Niger Delta region, the heart of the Nigerian oil industry. The district 
court in The Hague ruled that Shell Petroleum Development Company of Nigeria Ltd. (SPDC), a wholly-owned 
subsidiary, must compensate one farmer, but dismissed four other claims filed against the Dutch parent 
company.  Akpan v. Royal Dutch Shell & SPDC, District Court of the Hague, LJN:BY9854, 
C/09/337050/HAZA 09-1580 available at:http://www.milieudefensie.nl/publicaties/bezwaren-uitspraken/final-
judgment-akpan-vs-shell-oil-spill-ikot-ada-udo; Dooh v. Royal Dutch Shell & SPDC, District Court of the 
Hague, LJN:BY9854, C/09/337058/HAZA 09-1581 available at 
http://www.milieudefensie.nl/publicaties/bezwaren-uitspraken/final-judgment-dooh-vs-shell-oil-spill-goi ; 
Efanga & Oguru v. Royal Dutch Shell & SPDC, District Court of the Hague, LJN:BY9850, 
C/09/330891/HAZA 09-0579  available at  http://www.milieudefensie.nl/publicaties/bezwaren-uitspraken/final-
judgment-oguru-vs-shell-oil-spill-goi  
5
 Royal Dutch Shell Plc. is one of the world's largest independent oil and gas companies. Its registered office 
and place of incorporation are in the United Kingdom. lt is domiciled in the United Kingdom and  listed on the 
FTSE stock exchange.  lt is the parent company of the Shell group of companies (the "Shell Group”). 
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SPDC, in respect of liabilities under English law (in the RDS case) and Nigerian law (in 
respect of SPDC), but the parties agreed that it would proceed in respect of the SPDC alone. 
The claim was settled after a hearing of preliminary issues, in Bodo People v Shell Petroleum 
Development Company (Nigeria) Ltd.
6
  
Two further group claims of similarly significant proportions have subsequently been 
commenced by inhabitants from the Ogale and Bille communities respectively in 2016.
7
 The 
claims have been brought against both RDS at its London address and SPDC at its address in 
Nigeria, for which leave of the court to serve the claim out of jurisdiction has been sought, 
and obtained.
8
 On this occasion, by contrast with Bodo People, the parties have been unable 
to agree on the jurisdiction of the English court in respect of SPDC. While the claims against 
RDS are based on the party’s domicile in England,9 the jurisdiction of the English court in 
respect of the Nigerian subsidiary (SPDC) is contested. 
With so much attention being given to the ruling in Kiobel v Royal Dutch Petroleum 
Corporation,
10
 in which the US Supreme Court rejected jurisdiction on the basis of a pre-
presumption against the extra-territorial application of the US Alien Torts Statute (ATS),
11
 it 
is easy to overlook the fact that the principles and rules relating to extra-territorial litigation 
are grounded in national legal systems, and thus may differ from country to country. Thus 
putting the breaks on the once claimant friendly
12
 US approach does not necessarily close the 
door on other national paths within private international law.
13
 It is true that US law has for 
some time been ‘the main engine for transnational human rights and the environment 
                                                          
6
 Bodo Community and others v Shell Petroleum Development Company of Nigeria [2014] EWHC 1973 (TCC). 
7
 Lucky Alame and others y v Royal Dutch Shell plc and hell Petroleum Development Company of Nigeria Ltd; 
His Royal Highness Emere Godwin Bebe Okpabi and others  v Royal Dutch Shell plc and Shell Petroleum 
Development Company of Nigeria Ltd (unreported leave decisions of His Honour Judge Raeside QC, 
Technology and Construction Court, 2 March 2016). The discussion of this emerging civil action draws on 
Claim No HT-2015-000241, Exhibit DL/1 (Witness Statement of Daniel Learner) and Claim No HT-2015-
000430, Exhibit MD/1 (Witness Statement of Martyn Day). The cases will be referred to as the Ogale and Bille 
claims. 
8
 Ibid. 
9
 Article 4, Regulation (EU) No1215/2012 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 12 December 2012 
on Jurisdiction and the Recognition and Enforcement of Judgements in Civil and Commercial Matters [2012] OJ 
L351/1 (Brussels I Recast).  
10
 Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co., 133 S.Ct. 1659 (2013). For commentary on the case see, among others, 
For example, ‘Agora: Reflections on Kiobel. Excerpts from the American Journal if International Law and AJIL 
Unbound’ (2013) 107 American Journal if International Law 601. A. Grear and B. Weston, (2015) ‘The Betrayal 
of Human Rights and the Urgency of Universal Corporate Accountability: Reflections on a Post-Kiobel  
Lawscape’ Human Rights Law Review, , 21-44 
11
 Although the court left the door open for those claims that sufficiently ‘touch and concern’ the United State. 
R  McCorquodale, ‘Waving nor drowning: Kiobel outside the United States’ (2014) American Journal of 
International Law 846 -851. 
12
 Even though the qualification of ‘claimant friendly’ has been challenged by different academics, See J. Dine 
‘Jurisdictional arbitrage by multinational companies: a national law solution’ (2012) 3 (1) Journal of Human 
Rights and the Environment, pp. 44–69, at 45. 
13
 A. J Colangelo ‘The Alien Tort Statute and the Law of Nations in Kiobel and Beyond’ (2013)44 Georgetown 
Journal of International Kaw, pp. 1329-1346; R. P. Alford (2014) ‘The Future of Human Rights Litigations After 
Kiobel’ Scholarly Works. Paper 1063, available at: http://scholarship.law.nd.edu/law_faculty_scholarship/1063  
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litigation’,14  but alternatives are available in other jurisdictions.15 This article explores the 
extent to which the Shell nuisance litigation helps elucidate an alternative national approach 
to questions of jurisdiction, based both on the rules of jurisdiction mandatory for EU member 
states under the Brussels regime
16
 and, more specifically, on Britain’s unique common law 
constitution, which, it is argued, differs from the US in regard to the nature and strength of 
the presumption against extra-territorial jurisdiction.  
The analysis begins with a general overview of the European Jurisdiction and Enforcement of 
Judgments Regulation and common law and statutory jurisdictional rules in England and 
Wales. Attention is drawn, in the context of the traditional rules of jurisdiction to the 
distinction between claims that originate as of right (when served on a party at an address in 
England or Wales)
17
 and those that can only be served on the defendant at the discretion of 
the court (where leave is obtained to serve a claim on a defendant abroad). Subsequent 
sections examine the application of these general rules and principles to tort litigation bearing 
on the environment, including the Shell litigation. Section 3 considers service as of right 
cases – especially the ‘toxic tort’ cases Connelly18 and Lubbe19- where the court ruled under 
challenge from the defendant that the English jurisdiction was appropriate despite not being 
the forum conveniens in terms of satisfying the ‘ends of justice’.20 Section 4 considers recent 
developments in discretionary jurisdiction cases, including Cherney,
21
 and Kygyyz Mobil,
22
 
which have been criticised on the grounds of exorbitant jurisdiction, but which may prove of 
particular relevance to private international nuisance claims as they show a willingness, from 
the English courts, to extend jurisdiction to cases where a fair trial would be difficult, if not 
impossible in the more convenient forum. Section 5 considers the enforceability of remedies 
awarded in extra-territorial tort litigation, including the peculiar problems that are raised in 
regard to nuisance law by the fact that the primary remedy is an injunction (a coercive 
remedy). It is concluded that the English approach to allowing displacement of jurisdiction 
from the natural forum to an alternative forum where the case ‘can be more suitably heard for 
the interests of all parties and the ends of justice’23  under its traditional rules may represent a 
                                                          
14
 D. P. Stewart, ‘Kiobel v Royal Dutch Petroleum Co: The Supreme Court and the Alien Tort Statute’  (2013) 
107 American Journal of International Law 601 
15
 Notably in those adhering to the Brussels I Recast where claims initiated against a defendant domiciled within 
the territory of a member state will proceed.  
16
 The “Brussels Regime” or ‘Brussels system’ is uses to denote provisions under ‘Brussels I Regulation’ on 
jurisdiction and the recognition and enforcement of judgments in civil and commercial matters Reg. (E.C.) 
44/2001, [2001] O.J. L 12/1 and the Lugano Convention (which extends rules virtually similar to those under 
the Brussels I Regulation to Iceland, Norway and Switzerland). From 10 January 2015, the Brussels I 
Regulation was replaced by the Regulation (EU) No 1215/2012 of the European Parliament and of the 
Council of 12 December 2012 on jurisdiction and the recognition and enforcement of judgments in civil and 
commercial matters (recast) [2012] O.J. L 351/1 
17
 ‘England’ is used as a shorthand in jurisdiction terms for England and Wales in this article. 
18
 Connelly v RTZ Plc [1998] AC 854. (hereafter  Connelly) 
19
 Lubbe and others v Cape plc [2000] 1 WLR 1545.(Lubbe) 
20
 Although the jurisdictional grounds have changed in respect of these cases by virtue of the impossibility for 
the English court of staying actions in cases where jurisdiction derives from the Brussels regime. This is 
discussed in detail in section 4.  
21
 Cherney v Derikpaska [2009]EWCA Civ 849;[2010] 2 All ER (Comm) 456 (hereafter Cherney) 
22
 AK Investment CJSC v Kyrgyz Mobil Tel Ltd [2011] UKPC (hereafter Krygyz Mobil) 
23
 Spilada Maritime Corp v Cansulex Ltd [1987] AC 460. 
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valuable ‘unilateral’ development of potentially considerable importance to transnational 
environmental law litigation.
24
  
 
2. English Jurisdictional Rules in Context 
The rules and principles of private international law bearing on jurisdiction in civil claims 
differ from country to country, but there are nonetheless some meaningful generalisations 
that can be made as to the normative foundation for a court hearing ‘foreign’ claims.25 One is 
that there must be a minimum territorial link between the forum country and the facts of the 
dispute (or one or more of its parties). A territorial link is necessary, so the argument goes, 
because initiating a private claim involves symbolic assertion of power on the part of the 
state,
26
 even if increasingly symbolic.
27
  This underpins the presumption against the extra-
territorial application of the law in cases like Kiobel, where it was ruled that the human rights 
abuse allegations arising from Shell’s oil enterprise in Nigeria did not ‘touch upon and 
concern [US territory]….with sufficient force to displace the presumption against 
extraterritorial application.’28 It also informs the general rules of jurisdiction of the Brussels I 
(Recast) Regulation which revolve around the domicile of the defendant.
29
 
A contrasting basis for jurisdiction, independent of and capable of rebutting the territorial 
presumption, is consent of the individuals involved.
30
 This is based not on state power or 
authority but on individual autonomy in the sense given clearest expression in the context of 
European political philosophy by Kant.
31
  The idea is that people can choose where they are 
to litigate and that the court will respect that choice as a matter of principle.  
A third basis of jurisdiction centres on the idea – again central to the Western liberal tradition 
– of rule of law.32  A key facet of this is access to justice, sometimes couched in terms of the 
right to a hearing by a fair and independent tribunal in the determination of civil rights or 
                                                          
24
 On unilateralism, see G. Shaffer and D. Bodansky, ‘Transnationalism, Unilaterialism and International Law’ 
(2012) 1 TEL 31. 
25
  On the theoretical basis of jurisdiction, see E. Merrick Dodd Jr (1929) ‘Jurisdiction in personal actions’ in P. 
Botchers, (ed) Jurisdiction in Private International Law, (Edward Elgar, 2014)  Ch  1.  
26
 According to the English traditional rules symbolic power over the defendant or his property, either through 
physical service of a summons while in the forum   or seizure of property (often land) located in the forum 
justified the basis of jurisdiction: “Whoever is served with the King’s writ and can be compelled consequently to 
submit to the decree made is a person over whom the courts have jurisdiction”. John Russell & Co Ltd v Cayzer, 
Irvine and Co Ltd [1916] 2 AC 298 at 302, HL.Very few limits were established under this rule, the main ones 
involving use of deception or enticing the defendant fraudulently or improperly Watkins v North American 
Timber Co Ltd (1904) 20 TLR 534 
27
 On the symbolic aspect of this, see Lord Sumption in Abela and others v Baadarani and others [2013] 1 WLR 
2043 at 2063. Lord Clarke concurred (at 2060). See discussion below in this section. 
28
 Kiobel n. 10 at 1669.  
29
 Art. 4 Brussels I Recast: ’Subject to this Regulation, persons domiciled in a Member State shall, whatever 
their nationality, be sued in the courts of that Member State.’ 
30
 Arts. 25 and 26 Brussels I Recast. This is developed below, in this section, in respect of the English traditional 
rules. 
31
 I.  Kant,  Practical Philosophy. ed. and trans. M. Gregor (Cambridge University Press, 1999). 
32
 J. Raz, ‘Rule of Law and its Virtue’, in J. Raz, The Authority of Law: Essays on Law and Morality (Oxford 
University Press, 1979). 
5 
 
obligations.
33
 This right exists in some form or another in most of the world’s constitutions 
and in some countries reference is also made to the prohibition of ‘denial of justice’, which is 
a general principle of public international law.
34
    
In England, jurisdiction in actions in personam is determined first by the Brussels regime 
and, if the regulation does not apply, by the traditional rules of jurisdiction that in this respect 
are said to be residual.
35
 An important aspect of jurisdiction allocated under Brussels system 
is that a court with jurisdiction according to the provisions of the regulation cannot decline 
jurisdiction in favour of another court. This simplifies jurisdictional battles in court and 
provides legal certainty for both claimants and defendants.
36
  
Under the Brussels regime national courts have jurisdiction over those domiciled in the 
territory of a member state.
37
 The determination of the defendants’ domicile is done 
according to the national law of each member state.
38
 In England and Wales this is done 
according to the provisions of the Civil Jurisdiction and Judgments Act 1982 as amended by 
the Civil Jurisdiction and Judgments Order 2001.
39
  Corporations are domiciled in the place 
of their statutory seat, central administration or principal place of business.
40
 The Regulation 
also considers jurisdiction based on consent by it implicit or explicit.
41
 Creating a forum on 
the basis of access to justice was discussed at the time of drafting the Recast Regulation,
42
 but 
ultimately dismissed.
43
  
To elaborate briefly on the consensual basis of jurisdiction, not least because of its 
importance to the Bodo People claim,
44
 a foreign defendant submitting to the jurisdiction of 
the court can do so many ways.
45
 A defendant can submit to the jurisdiction of the court by 
acknowledging service without applying for an order of the court declaring that it lacks 
                                                          
33 Article 6.1 European Convention on Human rights (E.C.H.R.) European Convention for the Protection of 
Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, 4 November 1950, 213. 
UNTS 221 
34
 See  A. Adede,  ‘A Fresh Look at the Meaning of the Doctrine of Denial of Justice under 
International Law’ (1979) 14 Can. Year. Int. Law, p. 73.  
35
 A. Briggs, The Conflict of Laws (Oxford University Press, 2013) pp. 110-2. 
36
  The court with jurisdiction derived from the Brussels Regime cannot stay actions on the 
basis on forum non conveniens following the ECJ judgement in Owusu v Jackson [2005] (C–
281/02) E.C.R. I–1383.  
37
 Article 4. Brussels I Recast.    
38
 Article 62 for individuals and Art 63 for companies. id. 
39
 Section 9 ‘Domicile of an individual; and section 10 ‘ Seat of company, or other legal person or association 
for purposes of Article 22(2) (section 43). 
40
 Art. 63. Ibid. 
41
 Arts. 25 and 26. Ibid 
42
 A. Nuyts (2007) ‘Study on residual jurisdiction: general report’. Available at 
http://ec.europa.eu/civiljustice/news/docs/study_residual_jurisdiction_en.pdf at 64 
43
 For a discussion on the possibility of introducing an alternative general forum based on ‘necessity’ or access 
to justice see: Chilenye Nwapi, ‘Jurisdiction by Necessity and the Regulation of the Transnational Corporate 
Actor’ (2014) 30 Utrecht Journal of International and European Law, p 24,  at p. 32. 
44
 See below n 46. 
45
 For a discussion of common law rules on agreements on jurisdiction see,  J. Fawcett and J.M. Carruthers, 
Cheshire,  North and Fawcett’s Private International Law (14th ed. Oxford University Press, 2008), pp 383-448. 
Agreements on jurisdiction for the court of a Member State are validated by Article 25 of (Brussels I recast);  
also note Hague Choice of Court Convention of 2005 of 30 June 2005. 
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jurisdiction,
46
 or by instructing a solicitor to accept service on his behalf.
47
 Parties can also, 
by way of contract –or more frequently by a clause in a contract- agree to submit to the 
jurisdiction of a court to which they are not, otherwise, amenable. This is common in 
international commercial transactions where the parties may wish to choose a neutral forum 
for the resolution of a potential dispute. If such a jurisdiction clause were to exist, the court 
could be persuaded (provided all the other factors are present) to grant service abroad on the 
defendant unless there is a strong reason not to do so.
48
 However, it is not possible to confer 
jurisdiction consensually beyond the authority of the court.
49
 
What falls within the authority of the court is ultimately a matter (in the UK) for the court to 
determine, but Parliament has set out relevant provisions relating to a number of areas, 
including tort. Section 30(1) of the Civil Jurisdiction and Judgments Act 1982 as amended 
provides that:  
  
The jurisdiction of any court in England and Wales or Northern Ireland to 
entertain proceedings for trespass to, or any other tort affecting, immovable 
property shall extend to cases in which the property in question is situated outside 
that part of the United Kingdom unless the proceedings are principally concerned 
with a question of the title to, or the right to possession of, that property. 
 
By its very nature, as a tort to land, nuisance is capable of raising issues of title and 
possession which are ultra vires the courts’ authority.50  
 
Under English law, a distinction is drawn between claims originating as of right
51
 and those 
originating at the discretion of the court.
52
 Claims can be served as of right on a defendant 
that is present in England
53
 in the manner prescribed by the Civil procedure Rules.
54
 An 
English Company can be served at its registered office
55
 while a foreign company can be 
served either by making service on the person authorised to accept service on its behalf or by 
service to any place of business within the jurisdiction.
56
 The procedures for service on a 
company of Part 6 of the CPR cover alternative methods and places of service. 
                                                          
46
 CPR, para 11 (5) 
47
 CPR, para 6.4 (2) 
48
 See CPR Rule 6.20(5)(d); formerly RSC Ord 11, r 1(1)(d)(iv).  Fawcett and Carruthers, n. 45 at p 382. The 
court is also unlikely to stay an action on the grounds of forum non conveniens where there is valid English 
jurisdiction clause. . 
49
 For example in cases in respect of title to foreign land, or family matters where jurisdiction fora are 
compulsory. The title issue is particularly pertinent to nuisance law (see below, n 128, and associated text). 
50
 Id. 
51
 See n 26 and associated text. 
52
 Discussed in section 4. 
53
 “Whoever is served with the King’s writ and can be compelled consequently to submit to the decree made is a 
person over whom the courts have jurisdiction” John Russell & Co Ltd v Cayzer, Irvine and Co Ltd [1916] 2 AC 
298 at 302, HL 
54
 CPR r.6.3. Service may be made personally, or by post or by certain electronic means. 
55
Companies Act 2006, s 1139(1)  
56
 South India Shipping Corpn Ltd v Export-Import Bank of Korea [1985] 1WLR 585 (CA). See also CRP r. 6.3 (2); 
Saab v Saudi American Bank [1999]1WLR 1861 (CA) 
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Where a claim is served on a defendant as of right, but the domicile requirement of the 
Brussels regime is not engaged (and thus the regime does not apply), a defendant wishing to 
have the action heard in a different court must make an application to stay proceedings. The 
principle on which this application is made is that of forum non conveniens, which is set out 
by Lord Goff in The Spiliada (albeit that this is a case concerning service at the discretion of 
the court, contested by the respondent):   
 
The basic principle is that a stay will only be granted on the ground of forum non 
conveniens where the court is satisfied that there is some available forum, having 
competent jurisdiction, which is the appropriate forum for the trial of the action, i.e. in 
which the case may be tried more suitably for the interest of all parties and the ends of 
justice.
 57
 
In terms of the burden of proof, Lord Goff elaborated by emphasising that ‘the burden resting 
on the defendant is not just to show that England is not the natural or appropriate forum for 
the trial, but to establish that there is another available forum which is distinctly more 
appropriate than the English forum’.58  
Once that burden is discharged by the defendant, the onus then shifts to the claimant to 
establish that the English court, though not the natural forum, is the nonetheless the right 
forum for purposes of determining the rights of the parties and meeting the ‘ends of justice’.59 
The ‘ends of justice’ may or may not have some broad similarity with the ‘public interest’ as 
it is relevant in the US case law for example.
60
 The English courts are concerned exclusively 
with the private interests (including rights) of the parties, rather than wider, instrumental 
calculations bearing on the public at large. In this respect the ‘ends of justice’ may have more 
in common with ‘public necessity’61 applied, for example, in Canada, or forum neccesitatis62 
introduced as an autonomous ground of jurisdiction in Belgium and the Netherlands after the 
abolition of the exorbitant bases of jurisdiction based on the plaintiff’s domicile in the 
forum.
63
 Regardless, concentrating on the common law setting at hand, and to reiterate, the 
crux of the court’s inquiry is justice between the parties, in a highly casuistic- fashion. In the 
                                                          
57
 Spilada  n 23 at 476. 
58
 Ibid 477. 
59
 The second limb of the Spiliada test.  
60
 Gulf Oil Corp. v. Gilbert, 330 U. S. 501, and  Piper Aircraft Co. v. Reyno, 454 U.S. 235 (1981), analyzing the 
"private interest factors" affecting the litigants' convenience and the "public interest factors" affecting the 
forum's convenience. A four step approach is used by the 11
th
 Circuit Court as in Aldana v. Del Monte Fresh 
Prod. N.A., Inc., 2009 WL 2460978, 5-6 (11th Cir. Aug. 13, 2009). 
61
 Chilenye Nwapi, ‘Jurisdiction by Necessity and the Regulation of the Transnational Corporate Actor’ (2014) 
30 Utrecht Journal of International and European Law, p 24,  at p 32.  
62
 This is the case of Belgium or the Netherlands. See A. Nuyts (2007) ‘Study on residual jurisdiction: general 
report’. available at http://ec.europa.eu/civiljustice/news/docs/study_residual_jurisdiction_en.pdf at 64 
63
 Spiliada n 23 at 476. 
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words of Evans LJ
64
 the alternative forum must be ‘available in practice to this plaintiff, to 
have this dispute resolved’.65 
Moving on to claims served out of jurisdiction which require leave of the court, the rules are 
set out in CPR 6.36 and Practice Direction 6B, as above. In order to serve a claim on a 
defendant out of jurisdiction, the prospective claimant must satisfy three cumulative tests.
66
 
First, that they have a ‘reasonable prospect of success’;67 second, that there is a good arguable 
case that falls within the grounds of the rules;
68
  and third, that England is the ‘appropriate 
forum’.69 This latter test is fleshed out in a series of leading cases, notably by Lord Goff in 
The Spiliada,
70
 and most recently, by the Supreme Court in Cherney
71
  and Kyrygz Mobil.
72
  
In general, concepts such as ‘appropriate’ or ‘natural forum’73 have developed in the context 
of torts as undoubtedly pointing to the forum loci delictii where events leading to the damage 
took place.
74
 However, this does not impede exceptional cases from being litigated in a place 
other than the natural forum due to the unavailability of the forum delictii in a practical or 
legal sense. In VTB Capital Plc v Nutriek International Corp & Ors
75
  a case concerning a 
tort committed in England between foreign parties, upon approving unanimously the 
application of the Spiliada test for determining whether England was the appropriate forum 
the court found that Russia was the distinctively more appropriate forum, and thus rejected 
the previously held view that the place where the tort was committed was always and clearly 
the most appropriate forum.
76
 The English courts, it stated, will not approach a case by way 
of applying presumptions but would consider all relevant factors.  
Where leave is granted, under CPR 6.45 the claim form must include a copy translated into 
the official language of the country in which it is to be served. Here, the onus is on the 
claimant to satisfy the court that England is the right jurisdiction. As Collins explains in his 
history of English service out of jurisdiction law,
77
 the English courts have sometimes 
strongly expressed a concern that the English jurisdiction is ‘exorbitant’, to such an extent 
                                                          
64
  Mohamed v Bank of Kuwait and the Middle East KSC [1996]1 WLR 1483. 
65
 Ibid at 1485, emphasis by the authors.  Mohamed  has been criticized as an example of the wrongful 
coalescence of the first and second prongs of the Spiliada test, L. Merrett, ‘Uncertainty in the First Limb of the 
Spiliada Test’, (2005) 54 (1) International & Comparative Law Quarterly, p  201. 
66
 Roger Stewart, G. Chapman and Can Yeginsu ‘Londongrad Calling: Jurisdictional Battels in The English 
Courts’ (2014) 8(1) Dispute Resolution International, p 25, at p 26.  
67
 Carvill America Inc v Camperdown UK Ltd [2005] 2 Lloyd's Rep 457 , para 24. 
68
 Canada Trust Co v Stolzenberg (No 2) [1998] 1 WLR 547, 555–557, per Waller LJ (affirmed [2002] 1 AC 1); 
Bols Distilleries BV v Superior Yacht Services (trading as Bols Royal Distilleries) [2007] 1 WLR 12. 
69
 The Atlantic Star [1974] AC 436. 
70
 Spilada  n 23. 
71
 Above n 21. 
72
 Above n 22. 
73
 The concept of the ‘natural forum’ was discussed in in The Atlantic Star [1974] AC 436, Mac Shannon v 
Rockware Glass [1978] AC 705 and The Abidin Daver [1984] AC 398 in the lead up to adoption  of forum 
(non) conveniens in England  by The  Spiliada.  
74
 Recently, in tort cases, by the House of Lords in Berezovsky v Michaels [2000] 1 WLR 1004 HL but see 
below.   
75
 [2010] EWCA Civ 808, [2013] UKSC 5. 
76
 This had been left as an open question by the Albafort [1984]2 Lloyds Rep 91 and Berezovsky v Michaels 
[2000] 1 WLR 1004. 
77
 L. Collins, ‘Some Aspects of Service Out of Jurisdiction in English Law’ (1972) 21 ICLQ, p 656. 
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that it raises delicate diplomatic issues relating to other sovereign nations. For example, Scott 
LJ in George Monro v American Cyanamid mentioned that: 
Service out of jurisdiction at the instance of our courts is necessarily prima facie an 
interference with the exclusive jurisdiction of the sovereignty of the foreign country 
where the service is to be effected. I have known many continental lawyers of 
different nations in the past criticize very strongly our law about service out of 
jurisdiction.
78
 
Words used by the courts to describe limits on the exercise of discretion to serve out of 
jurisdiction include the need for ‘considerable care’,79 ‘extreme caution’80, and 
‘forbearance’,81 and ‘with discrimination and scrupulous fairness’.82 But these do not favour 
one or other party – they are about doing justice between the parties viewed in the round. And 
the very possibility of exorbitant jurisdiction being entertained affirms that the English law is 
willing to at least consider coming to the aid of a foreign claimant seeking access to justice – 
to a degree that is distinctive, and perhaps even unique. 
Lately the courts have appeared rather less cautious in the face of diplomatic delicacies than 
at certain times in the past. In Cherney v. Deripkpasa,
83
 there was an almost nil connection 
with England
84
 and yet the Commercial Court found allegations that the safety of the 
claimant would be at risk should he put foot in Russia enough to justify service abroad and 
thereby institute the jurisdiction of the court.
85
 Concerns with the ‘ends of justice’ in this 
particular case, in respect of Mr Cherney’s personal safety and physical integrity and of his 
prospect to obtain a fair trial in Russia were the fundamental drivers of this decision.
86
  
 
Similarly, the Supreme Court ruling in AK Investment CJSC v. Kyrgyz Mobil Tel Ltd
87
 
appears to push back from some of the cautionary remarks of the courts in times past. Here, 
the Privy Council, sitting on appeal from the High Court of the Isle of Man, allowed service 
out of the jurisdiction in respect of a claim whose natural forum was in Kyrgyzstan, ‘on the 
grounds that the risk that a Kyrgyz court would deliver injustice overwhelmed the ordinary 
operation of the Spiliada test.’88 The Privy Council addressed – and rejected - the defendant’s 
                                                          
78
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argument that comity required the court not to pass judgment on the adequacy of another 
state’s courts (in that case Kyrgyzstan): 
The true position is that there is no rule that the English court…will not examine the 
question whether the foreign court or the foreign court system is corrupt or lacking in 
independence. The rule is that considerations of international comity will militate 
against any such finding in the absence of cogent evidence.
89
  
While Cherney and Kyrgyz Mobil have been criticised as exorbitant,
90
 there is clearly a 
tension between comity and the ‘ends of justice’, which they courts address on a fact 
sensitive, casuistic basis (rather than with bright line rules of inclusion or exclusion). 
In Abela v Baadarin
91
 – where the main issue was the mode and timing of service out of the 
jurisdiction - a new language to qualify the Courts’ powers in extraterritorial cases was 
suggested by Lord Sumption. The defendant in this case resided in Lebanon, which is neither 
a signatory to the Hague Convention on the Service Abroad of Judicial and Extrajudicial 
Documents in Civil or Commercial Matters 1965,
92
 nor a party to any bi-lateral convention 
on service of judicial documents and the trial judge had allowed service abroad on an 
alternative method – at the address of the defendant’s solicitor. The Supreme Court held that 
the judge had been right under CPR r. 6.15(2) (to retrospectively permit service by an 
alternative method of a claim form on the defendant in Lebanon) on the basis that it was 
considered that there was a ‘good reason’ to make the order. The Court of Appeal overturned 
the trial judge’s decision to serve on the basis that it would ‘make what is already and 
exorbitant power still more exorbitant’.93 The Supreme Court restored the finding of the trial 
judge on the basis that the language of ‘exorbitancy’ was old fashioned and unrealistic. Lord 
Sumption gave a number of reasons why it ‘should no longer be necessary to resort to the 
kind of muscular presumptions against service out [of jurisdiction] which are implicit in 
adjectives like “exorbitant”’.94 Among those changes are that extraterritorial litigation ‘is a 
routine incident of modern commercial life’,95 together with (and reflected by) the growing 
number of multilateral agreements for cooperation in civil matters beyond commercial ones.
96
   
But the trend towards liberal exercise of discretion to serve out of jurisdiction should not be 
overstated. The court in Cherney went to some length to clarify that it was not passing 
general judgment on the Russian legal system or its standards of administration of justice. 
Indeed, the same judge, Lord Clarke, distinguished the decision (to which he had contributed) 
in Yugraneft v Abramovich,
97
 by holding a fair trial was possible in Russia between different 
parties and on different facts. Some subsequent cases where the claimant has sought to 
                                                          
89
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establish the jurisdiction of the English courts and discard that of the ‘natural forum’ based 
on considerations of the ‘ends of justice’ have been dismissed by the English court on the 
basis that a case has not been made out that justice is likely to be denied locally.
98
 
On the face of things, the debate arising from Cherney, Krygyz Mobil echoes somewhat that a 
few decades ago surrounding Lord Denning’s expansionist dictum in the Court of Appeal in 
The Atlantic Star: 
No one who comes to these courts asking for justice should come in vain. The right to 
come here is not confined to Englishmen. It extends to any friendly foreigner. He can 
seek the aid of our courts if he desires to do so. You may call this ‘forum shopping’ if 
you please, but if the forum is England, it is a good place to shop in both for the 
quality of the goods and the speed of service.
99
 
Yet the judgments in Cherney and Krygz Mobil are arguably of a different, nuanced, order. In 
neither is there a glib invitation to forum shop in England. The English court is not accepting 
jurisdiction on the basis that its justice process is the world’s best (as conveyed by the cliché 
‘Rolls Royce’ justice). 100. Rather, it is accepting jurisdiction because the common law 
recognises a fundamental right to a fair hearing vesting in anyone who persuades the English 
court that a hearing is impossible locally.
101
 The ruling can, in this way, be considered 
consistent with the principle of legality, which found influential expression in the writing of 
Dicey.
102
   
Indeed, it probably no coincidence that A V Dicey is the author of the leading late Victorian 
private international law (Dicey preferred ‘conflict of laws’) text,103 published a decade after 
his seminal constitutional study.
104
 Dicey the ‘constitutional lawyer’ wrote that ‘Our 
constitution, in short, is a judge-made constitution, and it bears on its face all the features, 
good and bad, of judge-made law.’105 With specific reference to the right to access to justice 
and to other common law rights, Dicey wrote that these are defined and enforced by the 
judiciary, on the basis that they are the source of the constitution.
106
 Dicey compared this 
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with codified European constitutions, in which the code was the positive source of rights 
(such that these rights could be limited or extinguished through reform to the code). Owing to 
their primordial or at least foundational status under Diceyan theory, they cannot be taken 
away by legislation without a’ revolution’.107  
Dicey did not elaborate on the ‘good and bad’ of this idiosyncratic constitutional 
arrangement, but some of it is obvious. What is ‘good’ about the arrangement is its 
responsiveness to individual circumstances. That is what the claimants in some (but not 
others) of the jurisdiction cases above discovered to their advantage. What is ‘bad’ is that the 
law lacks predictability – again, something that chimes well with the case law above. Thus, 
whilst Krygyz Mobil does appear to provide minimally clear guidance as to the onus being on 
the foreign claimant to satisfy the court that the natural forum cannot give them a hearing, 
cases of this kind will necessarily turn on their merits, where the margins will, invariably, be 
fine. 
A further way in which the constitutional context of English private international law is 
illuminating concerns the role played by leave of the court in both public law (judicial 
review) and private international service out of jurisdiction claims. Claimants seeking to hold 
a public authority account in terms of the rule of law, by way of judicial review, cannot bring 
a claim as of right. They must first obtain the permission (leave) of the court for a full 
hearing. The permission hearing is usually an ex parte process that answers to the need for 
the court to establish that the claimant standing to bring a claim and that there is an arguable 
case on the merits.
108
 The overwhelming majority of claims fall at this leave hurdle, but 
nonetheless leave serves the important function of affording access to a court, whilst filtering 
out ‘weak’ claims, whose hearing would unnecessarily add to the difficulties and 
complexities of government. In a private international law context, leave has the same 
function, except that it touches also on relations between, as well as within, sovereign 
nations. 
 
3 Extraterritorial Tort Claims: Jurisdiction ‘As of Right’ 
 Claims served as of right on the defendant
109
 can be contested by the defendant making a 
case as to why the proceedings should be stayed
110
 (claims served at the discretion of the 
court, on the initiative of the claimant, are considered in the section following). Although the 
discretion of the court and scope for staying actions has been firmly restricted by the ruling of 
the ECJ in Owusu v Jackson,
111
 where after a decade of ambiguous decisions regarding the 
ability of English Courts to stay actions commenced as of right in England, when the 
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alternative forum was a non-Brussels country,
112
 it was clarified that English courts can still 
stay actions when the defendant is not domiciled in a Brussels state and service has been 
effected as of right, for example, on a foreign company not domiciled but present in 
England.
113
 
Our discussion in this section draws on ‘toxic tort’ cases that today could not be subject to the 
same jurisdictional challenges, as they could not now be stayed due to the EU domicile of the 
parent company. These cases are Connelly and Lubbe, in which the English domiciled 
defendants sought a stay on proceedings on the ground of forum non conveniens (under The 
Spilliada ruling). However, these cases remain highly pertinent to the discussion of the 
ongoing Shell litigation. In particular, they contain guidance on the ‘ends of justice’ test as it 
is applies to the exercise of any discretion the court has to hear tort claims with a foreign 
dimension.  
In Connelly,
114
 the claimant (domiciled in Scotland) alleged injury whilst working in a 
uranium mine in Namibia operated by a South African registered company Rossing Uranium 
Ltd (R.U.L.). The company was a subsidiary of English-registered RTZ plc. The claimant 
pursued the parent company alleging that it was negligent in devising of the subsidiary 
company’s health and safety policy. The defendant sought a stay of proceedings within the 
framework of the forum non conveniens principle set out in Spiliada. Delivering the lead 
judgment, Lord Goff noted that the reason for the choice of parent company as a defendant 
over the subsidiary was that the claim could thereby originate as of right, and thus the onus 
fell on the defendant, if it wished, to establish that the claim should be stayed for want of 
appropriate forum.
115
The critical attraction of the English civil justice system was the 
availability of a firm of solicitors who were prepared to undertake the claim on a no win no 
fee basis. 
No doubt their [the defendant’s] domicile in this country, coupled with the availability 
of financial assistance here, has encouraged him [the claimant] to select them as 
defendants in place of R.U.L. But I cannot see that that of itself exposes the plaintiff 
to criticism. If he was going to sue these defendants, this was an appropriate 
jurisdiction in which to serve proceedings on them. It is then for the defendants to 
persuade the court, as they are seeking to do, that the action should be stayed on the 
ordinary principles of forum non conveniens.
116
 
The court held that the defendant had discharged the first stage of The Spiliada test: a 
Namibian court was the appropriate forum, as it was the forum where the injury was alleged 
to have been suffered, and many of the allegedly tortious acts causing the injury done. The 
onus then switched to the claimant to establish that ‘substantial justice cannot be done in the 
                                                          
112
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appropriate forum’.117 The lack of availability of legal aid and other assistance in Namibia 
was not in itself enough to ‘oust’ the natural forum, but it became so when situated in the 
wider context of the legal and evidential complexity of the claim. The House of Lords agreed 
with Lord Bingham MR’s analysis in the Court of Appeal that the court was faced with ‘stark 
choice’ between a natural forum where there never could be a hearing and one which, whilst 
‘not the most appropriate’, made a hearing is possible.118 
Lord Hoffmann added however the qualification that he would not have found for the 
claimant were it not for the fact that the claimant was no longer resident in Namibia. He 
doubted that a Namibian, or a Scotsman residing in Namibia, had a ‘legitimate expectation’ 
to sue an English company in England in respect of injury sustained in Namibia.
119
 However, 
that does not appear to have been supported by other Law Lords, nor was it followed in 
Lubbe (considered below).
120
 In that case 3000 South African-resident workers in the 
asbestos mining industry were able to sue in England, notwithstanding that South Africa was 
the appropriate forum. 
In Lubbe, like Connelly, the claimant’s choice of forum was driven by the practical 
consideration of the availability of legal expense support in England. The court was provided 
by the claimant with evidence of a ‘clear, strong and unchallenged view of the [South 
African] attorneys….that no firm of South African attorneys with expertise in this field had 
the means or would undertake the risk of conducting these proceedings on a contingency fee 
basis.’121 There was further evidence, to which the court attached some weight, that the South 
African civil justice system lacked the experience with ‘group proceedings’ that the English 
system had.
122
  
Applying this to the post Brussels Regulation regime, the inability of the court to stay an 
action commenced against a defendant domiciled in a Brussels Regulation state enabled the 
Trafigura
123
 and Monterico
124
 litigations to proceed without the habitual jurisdictional 
battles.
125
  Likewise, in Bodo People a claim was brought against both RDS and Royal Dutch 
Shell and Shell Petroleum Development Corporation Nigeria Ltd.
126
 Part of the attraction of 
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suing Royal Dutch Shell was that, as a company domiciled in England according to article 60 
(1) of the Regulation, it enabled not only the claim to be served as of right on the parent 
company at its English address, with service at this address on the Nigerian subsidiary, but 
also, unless SPDC could prove that there was no merit on the claim against the parent 
company,
127
 the claim against it could not be stayed on the grounds on forum non conveniens.  
In the event, the Bodo People litigation proceeded on the agreement between the parties that 
the subsidiary company would submit to the English forum on condition that the local 
Nigerian law was applied and that the claim against RDS was abandoned. 
The concern with the tort of nuisance – a tort to land – meant that the High Court at the trial 
on preliminary issues of law in Bodo People was invited to rule on the statutory exclusion of 
jurisdiction over questions of title to, or right to possession of land outside the UK. In Polly 
Peck it was held that whether a question was principally one of title was a matter of fact and 
degree.
128
 The judge in Bodo People ruled that this could not be resolved at a preliminary 
stage, but nevertheless the judge offered guidance as to the kind of facts which might lead to 
some of the claims might be precluded from being heard on this basis these include a dispute 
over whether the claimant was a tenant of land, and also the extent of a bailwick of a chief, 
king or headman suing in a representative capacity.
129
 Judge Akenhead hinted that some of 
the claims would have failed on this point, had the case not be settled after the preliminary 
issue hearing. 
A further noteworthy feature of the Bodo People judgment and the subsequent cases of Bille 
and Ogale is that of the substantive applicable law.  In Bodo the English court applied 
Nigerian law as agreed by the parties.
130
 Part of the preliminary hearing thus involved 
determination of what the Nigerian law was. The judge heard expert evidence of the correct 
interpretation of Nigerian law by two Supreme Court judges, one for the claimants (Justice 
Oguntade) and one for the defendant (Justice Ayoola). Understandably, the judge expressed 
‘trepidation’ at points where he disagreed with each of these experts.131  Even if the parties 
hadn’t agreed on the applicable law it is likely that the court would have applied Nigerian law 
to the conduct of SPDC for acts taking place in Nigeria, pursuant to sections 11, 12 and/or 14 
of the Private lnternational Law (Miscellaneous Provisions) Act 1995
132
, and pursuant to 
Articles 7 and/or 4 and/or 26 of the Rome II Regulation.
133
  
To conclude this section for claims against companies domiciled in the EU it is now much 
simpler to bring a case in the courts of any member state without fear of protracted  forum 
non conveniens jurisdictional battles. The remaining issues in such cases, and in those 
involving non EU domiciled co-defendants like Bodo, Ogale and Bille is on the determination 
by the court that there is merit on the claim against the European domiciled (parent) company 
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and that this has not been brought up with the sole aim of suing the foreign domiciled 
subsidiary as a co-defendant or necessary or proper party.
134
 For cases brought as of right 
against companies who are present but not domiciled for the purposes of the Brussels regime 
the English court still retains the ability to stay such cases on the grounds of forum non 
conveniens. 
 
4 Extra-territorial claims at the discretion of the Court 
As noted above, the Bodo People case eventually proceeded in the High Court consensually. 
By contrast, the SPDC in the most recent cases, involving the Ogale and the Bille 
communities, has contested the High Court’s jurisdiction. In a landmark (but as yet 
unreported) ruling, on the 2 March 2016, leave was granted for these latest claims to proceed 
against Shell Nigeria Ltd.
135
 These are the first occasions on which nuisance proceedings 
have been originated at the discretion of an English court.  
In the absence of a reported leave decision, it is difficult to comment on the reasoning of the 
court in granting leave. However, as explained above, there are well established principles 
regarding meeting the ‘ends of justice’ within the forum non conveniens test that are capable 
of displacing the natural/local forum (Nigeria). One consideration is whether the Nigerian 
courts are any better equipped than South African ones (in Lubbe) to hear a complicated 
group claim,. Nigerian legal practitioners would prima facie struggle to pursue a contingent 
fee claim on the scale of Bodo People with confidence, as the court acknowledged would be a 
problem in relation to South African legal practice (in Lubbe). If so, the Ogale and Bille 
communities in this new phase of Shell extra-territorial nuisance litigation did not (so the 
argument may go) ‘choose’ the English court jurisdiction over the local court jurisdiction; 
rather, the choice in these circumstances was between having a hearing or not.
136
 
It is helpful to reflect on the specific nature of the local obstacles to access to justice that 
could in principle justify extra-territorial jurisdiction in these and similar future 
circumstances. Rather than rely on broad notions of ‘obstacle’, a pertinent distinction can be 
drawn between impediments to access to justice based on ‘technical’ considerations 
(concerning fee, group claim and other arrangements concerning the administration of civil 
justice), and those of a more ‘political’ character (concerning discrimination and/or 
corruption in the national justice regime). The former describes the situation in Connelly and 
Lubbe (above), where the court attributed considerable weight to the absence of local 
availability of financial assistance (in Connelly)
137
 and the capacity to handle a complex 
group claim (in Lubbe).
138
 The latter describes the situations in Cherney
139
 and Krygyz 
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Mobil.
140
  The ‘technical’ and the ‘political’ obstacles to ‘ends of justice’ argument are not 
mutually exclusive, but the distinction is, nevertheless, important. The latter more deeply 
engages the principle of comity, in the sense that it is one thing to say that a foreign civil 
justice regime lacks the technical competence of some of the world’s most experienced 
regimes and another thing altogether to say that it is, sometimes, corrupt. 
Applied to the Ogale and Bille Kingdom claims, evidence is being put forward by the 
claimants’ legal representatives which covers both kinds of obstacle. In regard to technical 
obstacles, the following passage from a witness statement is illustrative: 
Most of the Claimants in this case are poor, rural Nigerians who live as subsistence 
farmers or fishermen. As a result, it may well be difficult for them to obtain suitably 
qualified legal representatives. There is no legal aid available in Nigeria for claims of 
this nature, which means that there is a stark inequality in resources between the 
Claimants and the Defendants in this case. Whilst claims of this nature can sometimes 
be funded using damages-based agreements or similar types of agreement, many 
Nigerian lawyers will additionally require payment whilst a case is progressing, 
including for drafting submissions or attending hearings. This is particularly true 
where a case is complex or where the lawyer is required to attend court frequently.
141
  
Further, it is alleged that the civil justice system is subject to lengthy delays. In SPDC v 
Tiebo, for example, the Nigerian Supreme Court in 2005 handed down judgment 17 years 
after proceedings were started.
142
  
At a political level, the obstacles centre on a deep distrust of the local civil justice regime as 
propping up the nation’s ‘oil oligarchy,’143 which was at the forefront of the US litigation in 
Wiva,
144
 the unsuccessful litigation in Kiobel,
145
 the Bodo People claim, and is, again, 
resurfacing in the context of the Ogale and Bille nuisance litigation. Thus, in the witness 
statements reference is made to ‘state interference in the course of justice’146 that includes ‘a 
widespread belief…that the Nigerian judicial system is vulnerable to interference and 
corruption.’147  
Cutting across the technical-political distinction is a delicate issue of international relations 
concerning the labelling of shortcomings in local justice in a foreign (in this case English) 
court. Muchlinski makes a salient point in connection with the removal of the Bhopal claim 
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from the US to the Indian court system, that ‘an admission by the home country [the US] that 
the host country is the better forum may give legitimacy to host country controls over the 
firm’.148 A corollary of this is that a show of confidence in the local regime – say the 
Nigerian justice system – can in principle help it improve and develop resilience. Indeed, 
whether the argument centres on technical or political obstacles to justice, the courts are 
necessarily engaging with a field beset with complex international political considerations. 
Again, Muchlinski captures this well in commenting that judges in this setting are never 
dealing narrowly with ‘a formal system of rules but a system of national policy 
implementation…Even where the judges do not intend it, decisions on jurisdiction will be 
read as political acts’.149  
The Shell nuisance litigation, and in particular the granting of leave in respect of the Ogale 
and Bille community claims, will undoubtedly offer considerable encouragement to 
individuals in other parts of the world who are victims of industrial nuisance in similar 
circumstances to the Niger Delta. Nigeria, prior to independence in 1963, was a British 
Protectorate (and before that a territory annexed to Britain).  It was under British rule that oil 
exploitation commenced, and with it Shell’s involvement in the region.150 This has remained 
in the background of the nuisance litigation, as has the fact that, after independence, 
opposition from local farmers and fishermen to Shell’s enterprise escalated.151 The 
suppression of this opposition by Shell and the Nigerian state prompted human rights abuse 
claims brought before the US courts on the basis of the Alien Torts Statute (Wiva v Shell
152
 
and Kiobel v Royal Dutch Petroleum Corporation).
153
  
In Palestine, like Nigeria a former British protectorate, the politics of occupation by Israel 
and the design of the legal system make access to the local courts by Palestinian nuisance 
victims as complex, due to the historical and political settings, as those faced by the Ogoni 
communities in Nigeria. There are multiple layers to private international law in the setting of 
Israel/Palestine.
154
 Under the terms of the Israeli occupation of Palestine, service of a 
nuisance claim in a Palestinian court on an Israeli-resident defendant requires the consent of 
that defendant.
155
  According to Israeli private international rules, a claim against the works 
(assuming the proprietors withheld consent to proceed in the Palestinian courts) can proceed 
in the Israeli High Court of Justice
156
 but, understandably, that may not be the forum in which 
Palestinians wish the action to be heard. Not only is there a perception among the local 
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Palestinian population of institutional bias in favour of Israeli parties – which may or may not 
be justified - but there is also a reluctance to endorse one or more of the institutions of the 
belligerent occupying force (the Israeli national courts) by invoking its civil justice 
machinery. As one commentator has remarked, litigation of tort claims involving Israeli 
defendants, before the Israeli courts, can sometimes be interpreted as ‘legal laundering’, by 
clothing Israeli occupation ‘in a cloak of legality’.157 
 
In recent years a Palestinian human rights organisation called Al Haq has been gathering 
witness testimony of victims of industrial nuisances with a view to bringing a claim in an 
‘international’ or extraterritorial tort action, possibly before the English courts. One of the 
most high profile industrial nuisance allegations centres on the Geshuri agrochemical works 
in Tulkarm.158 The works used to be located on the Israeli side of the border, but they were 
relocated into occupied Palestine as a consequence of complaints by Israeli neighbours (who 
sued the company in nuisance in the local court in Israel).
159
 When relocated to the 
Palestinian side of the border, the Israeli owners undertook not to operate the works when the 
wind blew in the direction of Israeli territory. In effect, the works operates only when the 
wind keeps its pollution within the Palestinian border. As a consequence, it is alleged that the 
locality is a hotspot of cancer, asthma, eye and respiratory health anomalies.
160
  . 
There are some obvious difficulties for a claimant in these circumstances (against a defendant 
not present within the jurisdiction or who is not a ‘necessary and proper party’ to an action 
against a defendant domiciled or present within the jurisdiction
161
) to obtain permission to 
serve the claim out of jurisdiction, and thus this case study is helpful in fleshing out some of 
the potential limits on the courts discretion in the present subject matter.  The first of such 
problems is the fundamental issue of whether in the absence of one of the grounds or 
gateways for service out of the jurisdiction
162
 the English (High) Court would be prepared to 
allow service out of the jurisdiction on a foreign defendant, for a wrong committed abroad, 
purely on the basis of the common law of natural justice.
163
 If that, by no means small, hurdle 
is to be successfully negotiated it will have to be on the basis of the unconscionability of 
having the case heard in Israel within a court lacking legitimacy in the context of belligerent 
occupation.
164
 The second hurdle lies in the distinction between the technical and political 
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grounds that the court will consider when establishing whether the ‘ends of justice’ should 
displace the natural territorial forum. Either way there are challenges. The Israeli High Court 
of Justice is highly respected worldwide for its judicial professionalism, independence and 
impartiality. As such it would appear to be difficult for the English court to be persuaded that 
the Israeli court would deny the Palestinian claimants a fair hearing. Equally, in Israel there 
are opportunities for affordably funding a large group nuisance claim.
165
  
Thus the outcome of Ogale and Bille is of far reaching significance. It will further illuminate 
the English court willingness to take on extraterritorial nuisance claims. Whether ‘necessity’ 
or ‘the ends of justice’ can operate as autonomous drivers to facilitate service abroad in the 
absence of one of the existing jurisdictional gateways remains to be seen.  
 
5. Enforcement of Nuisance Remedies in English Private International Law 
The potential enforcement of the court judgement forms an integral part of the forum 
selection by the parties in private international law cases. In a tort setting much depends on 
what remedies are sought. Nuisance remedies are particularly complex, for whilst they share 
many of the characteristics of tort remedies more generally, notably damages of a 
compensatory nature, there are differences of considerable importance from a private 
international law perspective. In particular, what Lord Goff called the ‘primary remedy’ in 
nuisance proceedings is not damages, but an injunction.
166
 The function of an injunction in 
this context is to put an end to an on-going civil wrong involving the use of land. In other 
words, an injunction requires the wrong-doer to use land ‘rightly’. If they fail to do so, the 
claimant can bring a claim for contempt of court. In the context of foreign territory, it is hard 
to imagine how an English court could police a nuisance injunction without risking a 
diplomatic crisis. 
The first consideration to note, therefore, is that a nuisance claimant must be realistic about 
possible limits on the range of remedies they can expect to obtain, if successful in 
establishing liability. Such realism appears to have shaped the handling of the case by 
counsel in Bodo People. Here the claimants reserved their position on the remedy of an 
injunction until after the trial on liability. As the case was settled, by what is believed to have 
been a monetary payment and commitment on the defendant’s part to clean up and restore the 
damage environment, no ruling on remedies was made. It would be unwise to speculate on a 
counterfactual scenario, except to mention that in principle, were an injunction to have been 
sought, the defendant would surely have been in a strong (if not unassailable) position to 
argue that an injunction ought to be withheld on grounds that policing an injunction awarded 
in respect of a foreign tort would raise serious issues of comity and exorbitant jurisdiction. 
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These cautionary remarks presuppose that the remedy of damages is more straightforward, 
which to an extent it is. Awards for damages against defendants served as of right (present 
within the jurisdiction) or with assets within the jurisdiction can be enforced automatically. 
The enforcement of judgments of English Courts in member states to the Brussels  regime 
has been greatly simplified by the revision of the Brussels I Regulation.
167
 Not only has the 
exequatur procedure
168
 been eliminated, alongside the declaration of enforceability,
169
 but 
according to the new article 54, if the remedy granted by the judgement is unknown in the 
enforcing court this can be adapted to a similar, known measure. The ease of enforcement 
within the European Union territory may be of relevance to potential claimants that could 
seek to benefit from the flexible grounds of jurisdiction of the English court as they exercise 
the discretion implicit in the Spiliada test for service out of the jurisdiction on a foreign 
defendant knowing that, although the defendant hasn’t got assets in England to satisfy 
potential damages, the judgment could be enforced in any of the other state members to the 
Brussels system.
170
 
If the defendant doesn’t have assets in England the claimant will need to apply to the (High) 
Court for a certified copy of the judgment,
171
 and present evidence of the original claim, 
service and, crucially, of whether the defendant objected or not, to the jurisdiction of the 
court and on which grounds.
172
 Enforcement in other jurisdictions outside the Brussels I 
Regulation
173
 scope will very much depend on the internal law of the country where the 
judgment is to be enforced and on the existence or not of reciprocal enforcement conventions 
between the UK and the country where the claimant seeks to enforce the English Court 
decision. Countries with which the UK has such agreements
174
 may enforce an English 
judgment by a simplified system of registration. But another note of caution: one of the 
impediments to registration or/and enforcement in the foreign jurisdiction may be the 
consideration that the English Court lacked jurisdiction to adjudicate on the matter.
175
  In 
cases where the English (High) Court has assumed jurisdiction in an extraterritorial nuisance 
case, one should wonder whether, paraphrasing Lord Ellenborough ‘the foreign court [would] 
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submit to such assumed jurisdiction’176 and enforce the judgment. The answer to this is 
‘probably not’. Attempts to make an English judgment against foreign defendants not present 
within the jurisdiction enforceable  by way of extending the territorial reach of an ex part 
order under CPR Part 71
177
 were rejected by the House of Lords in Masri v Consolidated 
Contractors.
178
 Their Lordships took a view against extending the extra-territorial reach of 
enforcement orders, sending perhaps a reminder to potential litigants that orders concerning 
enforcement are restricted to the place where assets are located and this factor should be 
taken into account by parties starting proceedings alongside jurisdiction and choice of law 
issues. 
The above black letter law remarks should be situated in a wider socio-legal context 
concerning the politics of private international law in a tort setting. In particular is the extent 
to which transnational tort actions can often serve symbolic rather than compensatory 
objectives.
179
 For example, in most of Alien Tort Statute actions pursued in the United States, 
it is understood that damages have not been collected.
180
 An explanation for this is that civil 
remedies are sought as a means ‘for providing a measure of self-respect, vindication and 
recognition for the victims rather than a mechanism of enforcement under international 
law.”181 That does not appear to have been the case in Bodo People, where the concern was 
with monetary compensation (out of which legal expenses would be paid). But one can easily 
imagine any claim in the setting of the Geshuri works, discussed above in section 4, having 
rights-vindication as its priority, whether as a standalone remedy (a statement of wrongdoing 
by a respected court), or to unlock a settlement in which the works cleans up its process and 
respects the rights of its neighbours.  
 
6. Conclusion 
There are many reasons for seeking to litigate an industrial pollution tort claim beyond the so 
called natural or home forum, within the framework of private international law. In some 
cases the search for a different forum is led by the applicable law or the remedies available,
182
 
whilst at other times considerations of access to justice are at play.
183
 Indeed, issues of 
substantive law and process are often interconnected and combine in the field of tort, to make 
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this subject as dynamic as it is. In many cases the choice between different jurisdictions 
signifies a substantive law advantage to one party or the other.  Occasionally the stakes are 
considerably higher than securing an advantage for one of the parties, in that ‘what is being 
decided is whether litigation can proceed or not at all’. 184 In this respect it is not an 
exaggeration to say that ‘t]he battle over where the litigation occurs is typically the hardest 
fought and most important issue in a transnational case.’185  
Looking ahead to the longer term development of extra-territorial tort litigation within the 
framework of ‘private international environmental law’ in England and beyond, it is 
instructive to situate the discussion within the wider public international law governing 
neighbouring states. It is particularly important to think back to, and draw comparisons with, 
the famous Trail Smelter litigation.
186
 This case of state liability for transboundary harm 
started out life, before it became a concern of central government agencies, as a private 
nuisance dispute between farmers and a factory on respective sides of the US/British 
Columbia border. Historical research into the context of the litigation reveals that the interests 
of the original prospective plaintiffs were ultimately prejudiced by the transformation of the 
dispute from the private to the public international law sphere.
187
 In particular, the US 
government did not wish to push evidence against the Canadian factory that would be used 
against wealth generating polluting factories operating in US territory, whether by US 
pollution victims or Mexicans the other side of the US southern border.
188
 This reinforces the 
point that tort based solutions to environmental problems have deep roots historically, and 
that nuisance is above all attractive as an ‘unofficial’ means of addressing environmental 
problems – in the sense that by-passes executive bodies in favour of direct access to courts.189  
This mirrors the trend towards bringing tort cases against corporations for human rights 
abuses alleging harm caused by ‘nuisance’ or ‘negligence’ rather than, for example, torture or 
violation of the right to life.
190
 
Bodo People and the on-going Shell nuisance litigation-Ogale and Bille- can be read, in this 
light, as an example of private international environmental law coming out of the shadow of 
its public international law counterpart, albeit in an arrangement that is complementary rather 
than mutually exclusive.  
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